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STUDENT NOTES
RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY TO CASH SURRENDER
VALUE OF INSURANCE POLICIES OF A BANKRUPT
The present statutory provisions relating in terms to the trus-
tee's right to a bankrupt's life insurance policies are contained in
Section 70a of the National Bankruptcy Act as amended. The ma-
terial part of that section provides:
"The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt shall
be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy ., except insofar as it is to property
which is held to be exempt, to all (5) property in-
cluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of
the petition he could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him .. Provided, That
when any bankrupt, who is a natural person, shall
have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender
value payable to himself, his estate, or personal repre-
sentatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash
surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the
trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure
to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and
continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from
the claims of the creditors participating in the distribu-
tion of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings,
otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets."'
Even under this provision, the trustee is not vested with title to
"property which is held to be exempt," and moreover this section
must be construed in connection with Section 6 of the Act which
provides:
"This Act shall not affect the allowance to bank-
rupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the
laws of the United States or by the State laws m force
at the time of the filing of the petition in the State
wherein they have had their domicile for the six
months immediately preceding the filing of the peti-
tion "Z
Since the amended sections as set out above differ m no ma-
terial respect from those sections as they appear in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898,1 the cases construing the quoted provisions since their
original enactment may still be taken as authoritative.
Referring to Section 6, it would seem clear, since there are no
laws of the United States providing exemptions as against creditors
'U.S.C. sec. ll0a (1940)
11 U.S.C. sec 24 (1940).
In Section 70a5 "who is a natural person" was added; other
changes were made in those sections which are unimportant here.
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in the case of insurance policies, that in determining the status in
bankruptcy of insurance policies on the life of the bankrupt the
laws of the State of the bankrupt's domicile must be examined and
given effect. However, the courts early found it necessary to deal
with the problem of construing Section 6 along with Section 70a5_
Section 70a5, if read alone, might seem to contain the whole law
and the prophets on the status of insurance policies of the type
therein dealt with, and an argument to that effect was made in
Holden v. Stratton, decided in 1905, where the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice White, determined the matter in the following
language: " the purpose of the proviso [70a5] was to confer a
benefit upon the insured bankrupt by limiting the character of the
interest in a lion-exempt life insurance policy which should pass to
the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when exempt to become
an asset of the estate."' (Italics writer's.) And it is now firmly estab-
lished that the law of the bankrupt's domicile as interpreted by the
state courts is the determining factor as to whether or not a life
insurance policy is exempt.' Therefore, it is readily discernible that
the variance in result obtained in the various courts when the prob-
lem arises as to who is entitled to the cash surrender value is not
attributable to diversities of interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
but rather to differences in state law.
For the purpose of determining the rights of the trustee and of
the insured bankrupt in policies held by the latter, they may be
classified in two groups-policies not exempt by state law, and
policies exempt by state law
POLICIES NOT EXEMPT BY STATE LAW
If the policy has a cash surrender value and is payable to the
bankrupt, his estate, or his personal representatives, the trustee is
entitled to it as an asset of the estate by virtue of Section 70a5.' Of
course, under the same section the bankrupt may avail himself of
the opportunity to pay or secure to the trustee the cash surrender
value of the policy and retain it free from the claims of creditors
participating in the distribution of the estate under the bankruotcy
proceedings. But if the insurance policy does not have a cash sur-
render value' available as a cash asset, the policy does not pass to
the trustee in bankruptcy and is exempted from operation of the
Bankruptcy Act.8
198 U.S. 202, 213, 49 L. Ed. 1018, 1022, 25 Sup. Ct. 656 (1905)
Legg v St. John, 296 U.S. 489, 80 L.Ed. 345, 56 Sup. Ct. 336
(1936), Cooper v Taylor, 54 F 2d 1055 (C.C.A. 5th 1932)
'Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50, 62 L.Ed. 143, 38 Sup. Ct. 36
(1917)
Hiscock v Mertens, 205 U.S. 202, 51 L.Ed. 771, 27 Sup. Ct. 488
(1907). (It was held that the cash surrender value of a life insurance
policy need not be provided for by the policy, but it is sufficient if
the policy has such value by concession or practice of the company.)
Mercer National Bank of Harrodsburg v. White's Ex'r., 236 Ky
128, 32 S.W 2d 734 (1930)
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Even if the proceeds of a policy be not made payable to the
bankrupt, his estate, or his personal representatives, as for example
where made payable to his wife, the trustee in bankruptcy may
nevertheless, under certain circumstances, succeed in obtaining the
surrender value as an asset of the estate.' Section 70a3 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, sometimes called the "power clause," provides that
powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own bene-
fit shall in turn be vested in the trustee;"0 hence, if the bankrupt has
the right to change the beneficiary and to surrender the policy for
the cash value thereof, it will pass to the trustee as an asset of the
estate upon his exercise of the power to change the beneficiary'
But where the policy does not reserve to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary without the latter's consent,' or where the
insured cannot himself be made the beneficiary under the terms of
the policy, 3 or by state law," the proceeds of the policy are not
assets of the bankrupt's estate.
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Switow,"3 the court
held that a consideration of Kentucky's exemption statute was un-
necessary, stating that the trustee's claim to the policy could not in
any event prevail because the assent of the beneficiary was neces-
sary to obtain the cash surrender value and, by the terms of the
policy, neither the bankrupt, nor his estate, nor personal represen-
tative could be designated as beneficiary Therefore, both funda-
mental elements were missing-(l) the right to change the bene-
ficiary, and (2) the right of the insured to receive the cash surren-
der value.
POLICIES EXEMPT BY STATE LAW
When Congress drafted the Bankruptcy Act, it sought to avoid
impingement upon state sovereignty As a consequence, the act pro-
vided in Section 6 that the allowances to 'bankrupts of exemptions
provided by state law should remain inviolate. Moreover, as we
have seen, Section 70a also made an exception for "property which
is held to be exempt."
Since the courts of the several states, as a rule, construe their
respective exemption statutes liberally, Section 70a5, in many cases,
'Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50, 62 L.Ed. 143, 38 Sup. Ct. 36
(1917).
'0 11 U.S.C. sec. 110a3 (1940)
'Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50, 62 L.Ed. 143, 38 Sup. Ct. 36
(1917). (The courts have completely disregarded the argument that
the power to change the beneficiary is thought to be a personal right
and have said, in effect, that the beneficiary may be changed by a
simple declaration under the power clause, Section 70a3 of the Act.)
3-In re Fetterman, 243 Fed. 975 (N.D. Ohio 1917)
"Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Switow. 30 F
Supp. 809 (W.D. K y. 1940).
14 In re Miller, 74 F 2d 86 (C.C.A. 8th 1934)
30 F Supp. 809 (W.D. Ky. 1940)
L.,T.-7
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has been rendered powerless to protect creditors. However, the
courts justify their liberal interpretation upon the basis of "the
humane purpose of preserving to the unfortunate or improvident
debtor or his family the means of obtaining a livelihood and prevent
them from becoming a charge on the public."' 6
Many of the states have insurance exemption laws. The Ken-
tucky statutes, exemplary of statutes in effect in those states which
are most liberal in this respect, are as follows:
"(1) A policy of insurance on the life of any per-
son expressed to be for the benefit of, or duly assigned,
transferred or made payable to, any married woman, or
to any person in trust for her, or for her benefit, by
whomsoever such transfer may be made, shall inure to
her separate use and benefit and that of her children,
independently of her husband or his creditors or any
other person effecting or transferring the policy or his
creditors.
"(3) If the premium on any policy mentioned in
this section is paid by any person with intent to de-
fraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premium
so paid, with interest thereon, shall inure to the benefit
of the creditors, subject to the statute of limitations.""is
"(1) When a policy of insurance is effected by any
person on his own life or on another life in favor of
some person other than himself having an insurable
interest therein, the lawful beneficiary thereof, other
than the person effecting the insurance or his legal
representatives, shall be entitled to its proceeds against
the creditors and representatives of the person effecting
the same.
"(2) Subject to the statute of limitations, the
amount of any premiums for such insurance paid in
fraud of creditors shall inure to their benefit from
the proceeds of the policy ,,9
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that these statutory
provisions, being in the nature of an exemption law, are to be lib-
erally construed for the benefit of the insured's family'
The federal courts in Kentucky have long taken a similar view
of the matter, and two outstanding cases reflect the operation of the
Kentucky statute in bankruptcy proceedings. In 1908, in a case
where the bankrupt's wife was the beneficiary of a policy which
contained a clause providing that the insured could at any time
change the beneficiary with the consent of the company, the Western
District Court held that the cash surrender value was not an asset
" Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F 2d 873, 874 (C.C.A. 4th 1929).
17 1 COLLi R, BANKRUPTCY sec. 6.16 n. 2 (14th ed., Moore 1940)
"Ky. R. S. (1946) 297.140.
"0 Ky. R. S. (1946) 297.150.
'See Parks v Parks' Ex'rs., 288 Ky. 350, 353, 156 S.W 2d 90,
92 (1941)
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of the bankrupt's estate and would not permit the trustee to bring
it into the estate through an exercise of the "power clause.' ' -1 In 1923,
under circumstances similar to those of the previous case, the Eastern
District Court held that an insurance policy in which two infant
children were designated as beneficiaries was exempt.2
Smith v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' which involved an
interpretation of a New Jersey exemption statute very similar to
Kentucky's, is in accord. There it was held that policies of insurance
which are exempt under the law of the state of the bankrupt's
domicile are exempt under Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, even
though they have a cash surrender value and the insured has power
to change the beneficiary. -"
Since the Kentucky. statutes provide that any beneficiary who
has an insurable interest in the bankrupt may hold the policy to the
exclusion of the' bankrupt's creditors, it seems that the exemption
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are not limited, in their applica-
tion in Kentucky, to the protection of members of the bankrupt's
immediate family. Clearly, blood. relationship is not essential to the
existence of an insurable interest. For example, in Sandlin's Adm'x.
v. Allen, ' the court held that a person has an insurable interest in
the life of another person, when the death of that other person 'Vill
cause him probable pecuniary loss, and when the survival of that
other person will likely be of pecuniary advantage to him.
In conclusion, for the purpose of determining the status of an
insurance policy of a bankrupt, it is imperative first to determine
whether and to what extent the particular type of policy is exempt
from the claims of creditors under the law of the state of the bank-
rupt's domicile. In making such latter determination, the statutes of
such state, as interpreted by its courts, must be given effect by the
bankruptcy court.
If the particular policy is not exempt, then whether or not the
trustee in bankruptcy can obtain its cash surrender value as an
asset of the estate will depend upon the following considerations:
If the policy is payable to the bankrupt, his estate or his personal
representatives, the policy will pass to the trustee subject to the
right of the bankrupt to retain it by paying or securing to the trus-
tee the cash surrender value as provided in Section 70a5 of the
Bankruptcy Act. If the policy is payable to someone other than the
bankrupt, his estate, or personal representatives, and if the insured
does not have the right to change the beneficiary, the policy will
in no event pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. But if the insured
does have the right to change the beneficiary the trustee may
' In re Pfaffinger, 164 Fed. 526 (W.D. Ky 1908)
-In re Renaker, 295 Fed. 858 (E.D. Ky. 1923)
S43 Fed. 2d 74 (C.C.A. 3d 1930).
Accord, In re Bendall, 28 F 2d 999 (E.D. Mich. 1928), In re
La Tourette, 23 Fed. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1938)
' 262 Ky. 355, 90 S.W 2d 350 (1936).
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exercise that right in his stead by virtue of the "power clause,"
thus making it payable to the bankrupt's estate and thereby bring-
ing it in as an asset in bankruptcy.
On the other hand, if the particular policy or rather the cash
surrender value thereof, is found to be exempt under state law,
then such cash surrender value will not pass to the trustee m
bankruptcy as an asset of the estate, nor can he obtain it by chang-
ing the beneficiary under the so-called power clause, even though
the bankrupt himself has the power to change the beneficiary
The Court of Appeals has stated that Kentucky's exemption
statutes relating to insurance policies are to be liberally construed.
Speaking generally the result of these statutes is that policies pay-
able to others than the insured, his estate, or his personal represen-
tatives, are exempt from the claims of creditors even though the
insured has the power to change the beneficiary.
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